Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

A critique of contemporary nonnaturalist moral realism
by Linden, Patrick, Ph.D., City University of New York, 2011, 237; 3481748
Abstract (Summary)

This dissertation defends the claim that nonnaturalist moral realism cannot be successfully formulated in terms of a constitution model similar to that proposed by non-reductive materialists for mental properties. Constitution metaphysics of moral properties fails to be non-reductive in any relevant sense; it is incompatible with the claim that moral properties are non-natural and it fails to provide any substance to the claim that there are objective values. Nonnatural moral properties are still in search of a believable metaphysics. The centerpiece of the dissertation is a detailed discussion of Shafer-Landau's metaphysics of moral properties as expressed in Moral Realism, since it is the most philosophically sophisticated proposal of a constitution model for moral properties. It will also be argued that nonnaturalist realism defended without a commitment to mind-independent moral properties fails to respond to common realist intuitions. In fact, the strongest intuitions about objectivity are not likely to find a comprehensible metaphysics. It is unlikely that this result will have any important social consequences.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Prinz, Jesse
Commitee: Cahn, Steven, Levin, Michael, Nagel, Thomas, Ross, Steven, Sarkissian, Hagop, Wilson, Catherine
School: City University of New York
Department: Philosophy
School Location: United States -- New York
Source: DAI-A 73/02, Dissertation Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Meta-ethics, Moral realism, Nonnaturalism, Shafer-Landau, Russ
Publication Number: 3481748
ISBN: 9781267013859
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