Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

The Problem of Meta-epistemic Disagreement
by Capps, David Christopher, Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 2011, 256; 3476644
Abstract (Summary)

In this work I develop what I call the problem of meta-epistemic disagreement. I argue that there is a kind of apparent intractable disagreement, embodied in recent disputes between internalists and externalists about epistemic justification, which calls for an explanation. I claim that such disagreement suggests adopting some form of antirealism about justification, construed as the denial of a single objective property denoted by 'justification'. I argue that each of the following antirealist positions about justification fails to explain meta-epistemic disagreement: nihilism, an ambiguity view, contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. In the final chapter I suggest a form of pluralism about justification that vindicates epistemic realism and addresses the problem of meta-epistemic disagreement.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Lynch, Michael P.
Commitee:
School: University of Connecticut
School Location: United States -- Connecticut
Source: DAI-A 72/12, Dissertation Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy
Keywords: Alston, William, Contextualism, Epistemic justification, Expressivism, Pluralism, Relativism
Publication Number: 3476644
ISBN: 9781124922522
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