Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade
by Olsen, Morten Graugaard, Ph.D., Harvard University, 2011, 239; 3462776
Abstract (Summary)

This dissertation consists of three chapters on incomplete contract enforcement and international Trade .

The first chapter analyzes the role of banks in overcoming incomplete international contract enforcement. It argues that banks function as mechanisms for building reputation when firms themselves are incapable of doing so and that other large entities can serve a similar purpose.

The second chapter explores the role of repeated interaction in overcoming contract enforcement domestically and argues that although repeated interaction can overcome the short run incentive for dishonest behavior when contract enforcement is poor, it comes at the cost of creating rigid relationships which can stifle innovation and lead to dynamic costs.

The third chapter explores the role of accumulated sector-specific human capital in accounting for the observed sluggish adjustment to trade liberalization, but show that the existence of sector-specific human capital might be of a benefit to low-skilled workers, even - as we suggest is the case - the existence of sector-specific human capital is predominantly a feature of less educated workers.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Antras, Pol, Helpman, Elhanan, Hart, Oliver, Shleifer, Andrei
Commitee:
School: Harvard University
School Location: United States -- Massachusetts
Source: DAI-A 72/09, Dissertation Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Economics, Banking
Keywords: Banking, Contract enforcement, International trade, Letter of credit, Relationships, Repeated interaction
Publication Number: 3462776
ISBN: 978-1-124-73768-3
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