Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Pricing and Lead-Time Decisions in a Duopoly Common Retailer Channel
by Niu, Xiuming, M.Sc., Singapore Management University (Singapore), 2011, 71; 1494100
Abstract (Summary)

This thesis studies a dual-level decentralized supply chain consisting of two suppliers and two retailers facing a price- and lead-time-sensitive demand. We model the suppliers' operations as M/M/1 queues and demand as a linear function of the retail prices and promised delivery lead-times offered to the customers. Three different kinds of games are constructed to analyze the pricing and lead-time decisions of the suppliers and retailers. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in all games and provide the exact formulas to compute the optimal decisions for both the suppliers and retailers. We further present numerical examples to illustrate how the results of our model can be used to provide useful managerial insights for selecting the best strategies for suppliers and retailers under different market and operational environments.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Wu, Zhengping
School: Singapore Management University (Singapore)
Department: Lee Kong Chian School of Business
School Location: Republic of Singapore
Source: MAI 49/06M, Masters Abstracts International
Subjects: Management, Commerce-Business, Operations research
Keywords: Duopoly common retailer channel, Lead time, Pricing, Stackelberg game, Vertical Nash game
Publication Number: 1494100
ISBN: 978-1-124-67998-3
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