The Portuguese Inquisition lasted for centuries, sentenced tens of thousands of people and created a global Diaspora. However, an analytical approach to understanding fluctuations in inquisitorial severity is lacking. I use a Public Choice framework of the inquisition by treating it as a power and wealth seeking bureaucracy. I find that economic conditions affected overall sentencing; as well as political. Anti-inquisitorial lobbying is found to be effective. Inquisitors acted to protect their co-religionists, engaged in systematic rent seeking behavior and shifted their focus when it became politically expedient. Far from being a pious Catholic institution intent on keeping religion pure, the inquisition acted as a bureaucracy like any other modern one complete with rent seeking, lobbying and politics.
|Advisor:||Nye, John V.|
|School:||George Mason University|
|School Location:||United States -- Virginia|
|Source:||DAI-A 72/07, Dissertation Abstracts International|
|Subjects:||Religious history, European history, Economics|
|Keywords:||Anti-inquisitorial lobbying, Bureaucracy, Portugal, Portugese Inquisition, Sentencings|
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