This paper examines Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a corporate strategy, segregating filings for corporate reorganization in the U.S. from 1998 through 2007 into those due to financial distress (FDB) and those believed to be for risk-management purposes (RMB). Twenty-seven RMB and 199 FDB firms were compared to each other, and to 226 matched non-bankrupt firms. Altman's Z-score clearly differed between the RMB and FDB firms, suggesting that the two are separate constructs financially as well as legally. A subset of 81 firms (the 27 RMB matched to 27 non-bankrupt and 27 FDB) were studied for turnover among the members of the top management team, the board chair, and the members of the board. With the exception of the board chair, FDB firms exhibited materially higher turnover in these positions than their RMB counterparts. These results support FDB and RMB as separate constructs with dissimilar antecedents and outcomes, and suggest that executives and board members involved with RMB filings do not experience the adverse career consequences that follow an FDB filing.