I defend Donald Davidson's theory of radical interpretation against Kirk Ludwig, Peter Klein and Colin McGinn, who claim that Davidson's theory fails to refute global skepticism. I show that each of their arguments depends on misinterpretations of Davidson's argument and how he applied his theory to the problem of global skepticism. As a consequence, I also argue that a rebuttal to these criticisms can be given on Davidson's behalf.
|School:||California State University, Long Beach|
|School Location:||United States -- California|
|Source:||MAI 48/02M, Masters Abstracts International|
Copyright in each Dissertation and Thesis is retained by the author. All Rights Reserved
The supplemental file or files you are about to download were provided to ProQuest by the author as part of a
dissertation or thesis. The supplemental files are provided "AS IS" without warranty. ProQuest is not responsible for the
content, format or impact on the supplemental file(s) on our system. in some cases, the file type may be unknown or
may be a .exe file. We recommend caution as you open such files.
Copyright of the original materials contained in the supplemental file is retained by the author and your access to the
supplemental files is subject to the ProQuest Terms and Conditions of use.
Depending on the size of the file(s) you are downloading, the system may take some time to download them. Please be