Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

A defense of Mackie's error theory
by Anis, Saad, M.A., California State University, Long Beach, 2009, 86; 1472258
Abstract (Summary)

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a defense of John L. Mackie's error theory–the view that all positive attributions of objective moral value are false–against some of its more recent critics. These critics include David Brink, Michael Huemer, Simon Blackburn, and Jonathan Harrison. Mackie supports his view by arguing for internalism–the view that the recognition of moral facts necessarily motivates or provides reason for the agent to act accordingly–and by using his arguments from disagreement and queerness against the existence of objective moral values. My argument is that while the thesis of internalism is indefensible, the arguments from disagreement and queerness stand on their own as a successful denial of objectively existing moral values. If my defense of Mackie is successful, it opens the door for subjectivist theories of ethics.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Raibley, Jason R.
School: California State University, Long Beach
School Location: United States -- California
Source: MAI 48/02M, Masters Abstracts International
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: John L. Mackie
Publication Number: 1472258
ISBN: 978-1-109-47195-3
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