Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

*Observation, explanation, and intuition: Two arguments against moral realism
by Arima, Hitoshi, Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 2009, 206; 3356123
Abstract (Summary)

The purpose of this dissertation is to establish the faulty of moral realism. Moral realism is here understood as comprising of two metaphysical claims: Namely, (1) that moral values exist as a property of human actions and characters and social institutions and (2) that they exist objectively, i.e., exist independently of our beliefs and knowledge and social conventions. In the dissertation two of the major criticisms that have been hurled against moral realism (namely, an Argument from Explanation and an Argument from Intractability of Moral Opinions) as well as moral realists’ various responses to these criticisms will be examined. It will be concluded that none of these realists’ responses are successful, and therefore, moral realism cannot be defended.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Dipert, Randall
Commitee: Shockley, Kenneth, Smith, Barry
School: State University of New York at Buffalo
Department: Philosophy
School Location: United States -- New York
Source: DAI-A 70/05, Dissertation Abstracts International
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: An argument from explanation, Disagreements in moral opinions, Intuition, Moral property realism, Moral realism, Observation, Scientific and moral intuitions
Publication Number: 3356123
ISBN: 9781109159448
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