Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Essays in economic theory
by Nava, Francesco, Ph.D., The University of Chicago, 2009, 136; 3369457
Abstract (Summary)

The thesis consists of two essays in economic theory. The first presents a model of quantity competition in networked markets. The purpose of this study is: (1) to characterize prices and flows in networked markets in which equilibrium dictates who buys and who sells in an economy; and (2) to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a competitive equilibrium to arise in such markets. The second essay discusses how the ability to jointly rule out actions affects the analysis of a strategic form game. The study shows that if players have sufficiently many instances in which to agree on which actions to rule out, then any individually rational allocation can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium of a joint commitment game.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Sonnenschein, Hugo F.
Commitee: Myerson, Roger B., Reny, Philip J.
School: The University of Chicago
Department: Economics
School Location: United States -- Illinois
Source: DAI-A 70/08, Dissertation Abstracts International
Subjects: Economics, Economic theory
Keywords: Competitive equilibrium, Implementation, Joint commitment, Networked markets, Quantity competition
Publication Number: 3369457
ISBN: 978-1-109-31567-7
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