This dissertation examines the problem of the emergence of new human infectious diseases from an interdisciplinary perspective. I apply concepts and tools from international relations, economics, and epidemiology to understand the threat that emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose globally, and to gauge the level to which the international system provides key global public goods (GPGs) required to effectively counter the EID threat. Using lessons from four case study EIDs (H5N1 “avian” influenza, SARS, HIV/AIDS, and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis), I build game theory models of country-level decision-making on: (1) investment in surveillance for early disease detection, (2) international reporting of EID events, and (3) EID containment and response measures. I find each of these GPGs can be considered a collective action problem, but that underlying each is coordination game. In each of these activities, all countries are better off under a system of cooperation and full provision of the GPGs, but without adequate trust and robust international institutions, country decisions which are individually rational but made in an anarchic international system lead to a globally inefficient outcome. The principal problem for developing international institutions to support EID surveillance, reporting, and response is in moving countries from the individually rational equilibrium to what is the mutually preferred outcome.
|School:||The Johns Hopkins University|
|School Location:||United States -- Maryland|
|Source:||DAI-A 70/10, Dissertation Abstracts International|
|Subjects:||Economics, International law, Epidemiology|
|Keywords:||Emerging infectious diseases, Game theory, HIV/AIDS, Infectious diseases, International political economy, Political economy, SARS, Severe acute respiratory syndrome|
Copyright in each Dissertation and Thesis is retained by the author. All Rights Reserved
The supplemental file or files you are about to download were provided to ProQuest by the author as part of a
dissertation or thesis. The supplemental files are provided "AS IS" without warranty. ProQuest is not responsible for the
content, format or impact on the supplemental file(s) on our system. in some cases, the file type may be unknown or
may be a .exe file. We recommend caution as you open such files.
Copyright of the original materials contained in the supplemental file is retained by the author and your access to the
supplemental files is subject to the ProQuest Terms and Conditions of use.
Depending on the size of the file(s) you are downloading, the system may take some time to download them. Please be