This dissertation examines Fichte’s original philosophical system, or the Wissenschaftslehre, against the background of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and was conceived within the framework of restating Kant’s critical philosophy. Although Fichte hyperbolically claims that his philosophical view is identical with Kant’s transcendental system, the question of his relationship to Kant is a controversial one and continues to generate intense debate in the literature. Some Fichte commentators flatly reject comparisons between the two philosophical positions, claiming that Fichte’s system is a variant of Reinhold’s, whose Elementarphilosophie sought to return Kant to a Cartesian model of mind. Others, however, see striking similarities between the theories of Kant and Fichte. They maintain, though, that Fichte’s Kantianism should be qualified: for although certain aspects of his theory look obviously Kantian, they insist that Fichte’s theory is still unique in a variety of ways.
This dissertation argues the thesis that Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is identical with and yet different from Kant’s theory. To the extent that Fichte rejects a representationalist solution to the problem of knowledge, his position is true to the spirit of Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy. However, to the extent that his method of presentation differs from Kant’s, Fichte’s view is his own and should be evaluated on its own merit.
|Commitee:||Polansky, Ronald, Selcer, Daniel|
|School Location:||United States -- Pennsylvania|
|Source:||DAI-A 70/10, Dissertation Abstracts International|
|Keywords:||Circular justification, Epistemology, German idealism, Monism, Self-referentiality, Wissenschaftslehre|
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