This dissertation examines how relations between different actors in the Egyptian opposition have contributed to the endurance of authoritarianism in Egypt over the past three decades. In this dissertation, I argue that the durability of authoritarianism in Egypt, and elsewhere in the Arab world, is not simply a function of regime strength and cohesion, as the conventional wisdom maintains, but that it is also a function of important divisions and mobilizational asymmetries between different actors in the opposition, particularly between Islamists and non-Islamists. I argue that ideological divisions and mobilizational asymmetries have impeded successful cooperation and alliance building between Islamists and non-Islamists and have thus inhibited broad based mobilization against the authoritarian regime, even during moments of regime crisis. These divisions have also lowered the cost of repression and allowed the authoritarian regime to successfully play off different forces against one another in order to ensure its continued hegemony.