Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Consciousness and intentionality: Issues in Husserl
by Sigrist, Michael J., Ph.D., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2009, 279; 3405902
Abstract (Summary)

This dissertation focuses upon the relationship between consciousness and intentionality within the phenomenological tradition. Husserl’s phenomenology is grounded upon two premises. The first is a metaphysical premise about consciousness: conscious experience is essentially intentional. The second premise is methodological: intentional structures are best studied from the point of view of conscious experience itself. The dissertation is a broad defense of both premises. Husserl argues for a first person or experiential account of representational content. In the first chapter I argue that naturalistic objections to this sort of project are misplaced. In the second chapter I argue that it is misleading to characterize conscious experience exclusively through its abstract phenomenal quality or ‘feel.’ This approach neglects the disclosive or world-presenting function of consciousness. In the third chapter I argue on behalf of Husserl’s subjective account of meaning, contrasting it with what I argue are weaknesses in use- and conventional theories of meaning. Finally, in chapter four I argue that Husserl’s framework and methodology are consistent with direct realism.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Ihde, Don
Commitee:
School: State University of New York at Stony Brook
School Location: United States -- New York
Source: DAI-A 71/05, Dissertation Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Consciousness, Expression, Husserl, Edmund, Intentionality, Realism, Semantics, Transcendentalism
Publication Number: 3405902
ISBN: 9781109725131
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