It is difficult to deny that we all have a dependence on testimony for coming to know large swaths of basic knowledge. Statements regarding what food we ought to eat, what the weather will be like a few days from now, or who the twelfth president of the United States was are examples of information that we acquire through testimony. Most of us likely do not have qualms with acquiring knowledge in this way. However, we might wonder whether the situation is the same for testimony with moral substance. In this thesis, I argue that moral and nonmoral testimony are not as different as has previously been supposed. I will argue that moral testimony can be justifiably adopted for the same reasons that nonmoral testimony can be justifiably adopted–those reasons being that it is possible to evaluate the sources of moral testimony through indirect means which touch on their reliability.
|Commitee:||Wallis, Charles, Nolan, Lawrence|
|School:||California State University, Long Beach|
|School Location:||United States -- California|
|Source:||MAI 82/10(E), Masters Abstracts International|
|Subjects:||Ethics, Philosophy, Epistemology|
|Keywords:||Meta-ethics, Social epistemology, Moral tesimony, Nonmoral testimony|
Copyright in each Dissertation and Thesis is retained by the author. All Rights Reserved
The supplemental file or files you are about to download were provided to ProQuest by the author as part of a
dissertation or thesis. The supplemental files are provided "AS IS" without warranty. ProQuest is not responsible for the
content, format or impact on the supplemental file(s) on our system. in some cases, the file type may be unknown or
may be a .exe file. We recommend caution as you open such files.
Copyright of the original materials contained in the supplemental file is retained by the author and your access to the
supplemental files is subject to the ProQuest Terms and Conditions of use.
Depending on the size of the file(s) you are downloading, the system may take some time to download them. Please be