Nation-states will interfere in the 2020 United States (U.S.) presidential election. Foreign election interference undermines voters’ trust and confidence in the reliable outcome of elections. The purpose of this inquiry was to examine how allies of the U.S. could compromise voting software supply chains to interfere in the November 2020 presidential election. This study examined how methods used to secure the supply chains for critical infrastructure could be applied to the voting software industry to identify and mitigate software supply chain threats. This research found that Israel, France, and presumably other U.S. allies could exploit vulnerabilities in the voting software supply chain to interfere in the November 2020 presidential election. The election infrastructure calls for more robust federal regulations to enforce software supply chain security to mitigate threats and protect future elections from foreign interference while increasing public confidence and trust. This exploration recommended further research in foreign election interference by allies. Additional research is required to recognize how other sectors of critical infrastructure could educate the voting industry in software supply chain risk mitigation. Future policies are vital to maintaining federal oversight of the voting software supply chain to minimize risks and maximize voter confidence and trust. Further research could concentrate on the international crisis of the COVID-19 global pandemic and how allies may have taken advantage of the pandemonium to infiltrate the voting software supply chain effortlessly.
|School Location:||United States -- New York|
|Source:||MAI 81/11(E), Masters Abstracts International|
|Subjects:||Information Technology, Political science|
|Keywords:||Ally, Cybersecurity, Department of Defense, Doctor Donnie Wendt, Foreign election interference, Software supply chain|
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