Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

The Effects of Pay Raise Frequency within Groups on Collusion
by Sauciuc, Ashley K., Ph.D., The University of Arizona, 2019, 58; 27549105
Abstract (Summary)

This study examines how the frequency of performance-based pay raise opportunities affects collusion within groups. I predict that expectations of future reciprocity between group members will increase the likelihood of collusion during raise periods compared to non-raise periods, even in a setting subject to deterrent controls (e.g., mutual monitoring). Furthermore, the frequency of these raise periods determines which of two theoretical reporting norms develops. I find that groups with relatively infrequent pay raises oscillate between collusion during raise periods and truthful reporting during non-raise periods, consistent with moral licensing theory. Conversely, when pay raise frequency is high, I document a bleed-over effect whereby collusion spreads into the non-raise periods, consistent with ethical erosion. Specifically, while fewer participants in the high (vs. low) frequency conditions colluded during raise periods, those that did tended to collude throughout.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Schatzberg, Jeffrey
Commitee: Hewitt, Max, Douthit, Jeremy
School: The University of Arizona
Department: Accounting
School Location: United States -- Arizona
Source: DAI-A 81/6(E), Dissertation Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Accounting
Keywords: Collusion, Compensatory ethics, Ethical erosion, Mutual monitoring, Raise frequency
Publication Number: 27549105
ISBN: 9781392843161
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