Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Clientelism and Party Politics: Evidence from Nigeria
by Zovighian, Diane, Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2018, 283; 10826911
Abstract (Summary)

This dissertation provides an explanation for the workings of clientelism and some preliminary insights on the conditions under which it can recede.

First, I provide evidence from Nigeria on the “loyal-voter anomaly” (Stokes et al. 2013, 66): I show that political parties tend to target clientelistic transfers to partisans, whose votes should already be secure, rather than to swing voters, whose votes are up for grabs. Second, I develop a theory of strategic safe-betting to explain the disproportionate targeting of partisans. This theory puts the emphasis on risk mitigation, an aspect of clientelistic relations that existing explanations tend to overlook. I argue that clientelistic transfers are risky and expensive endeavors, and that loyal voters represent a safer bet for political parties: their voting behavior is indeed easier to influence, predict or, in a best-case scenario, monitor. This is due to their close ties to the operatives of the party machine, as well as their deeper embeddedness in networks of control through which parties exert influence and gather information on voters before and during elections. Third, I provide preliminary insights on the demise of clientelism. I show that macro developments—in particular urbanization and economic development—that increase the weight of swing voters make clientelistic transfers riskier and provide incentives for parties to develop programmatic promises during elections.

The dissertation builds on original quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence from the most populous sub-Saharan African country, Nigeria. It draws on observational and experimental survey data to provide a quantitative analysis of the determinants and workings of clientelism at the individual level. It also builds on selected archival documents and in-depth key informant interviews to develop a qualitative narrative of the historical roots of clientelistic partisan pacts in Nigeria and the mechanisms that sustain and break them in contemporary politics.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Howard, Marc Morjé
Commitee: Bennett, Andrew, Girod, Desha, Klašnja, Marko
School: Georgetown University
Department: Government
School Location: United States -- District of Columbia
Source: DAI-A 79/12(E), Dissertation Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: African Studies, Political science
Keywords: Clientelism, Distributive politics, Elections, Nigeria, Partisanship, Vote-buying
Publication Number: 10826911
ISBN: 9780438249042
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