Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

CEO Compensation around Corporate Spinoffs
by Zhang, Qiongyao, Ph.D., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2017, 35; 10620290
Abstract (Summary)

Our study examines whether CEO compensation decreases in response to the reduction in firm size after a corporate spinoff. We find overall that CEO pay decreases subsequent to the spinoff, consistent with efficiency theory. However, the decrease is driven by the pay adjustment ac- companying CEO turnover around the spinoff. New CEOs hired around the spinoff have little bargaining power in regards to their compensation and thus we observe a decline in CEO compensation around these spinoff events. The compensation of those CEOs which span the spinoff event does not decrease, consistent with the notion of CEO entrenchment.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Schwartz, Steven
Commitee: Jagannathan, Murali, Ross, Jonathan
School: State University of New York at Binghamton
Department: Management
School Location: United States -- New York
Source: DAI-A 79/10(E), Dissertation Abstracts International
Subjects: Accounting, Finance
Keywords: Bargaining power, CEO, Turnover
Publication Number: 10620290
ISBN: 978-0-438-02539-4
Copyright © 2020 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Terms and Conditions Privacy Policy Cookie Policy