This dissertation explores the effect of information disclosure interventions on the performance of Reverse Multi-attribute Auctions. A conceptual model that integrates information asymmetry theory, signaling theory and decision process theory is developed. Computer-based experiments are then employed to compare the performance of multi-attribute auctions that make use of different information disclosure policies. Results indicate that having preference and public information leads to better performing auctions than having private or no information. Public information appears to trigger more aggressive bidding than all other information types assessed. Finally, preference, public and private information all play an important role in building bidder confidence.
|School:||Kent State University|
|Department:||Management and Information Systems|
|School Location:||United States -- Ohio|
|Source:||DAI-A 79/08(E), Dissertation Abstracts International|
|Keywords:||Decision process, Information asymmetry, Information disclosure, Multi-attribute auction, Signaling|
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