In microfinance and similar relational lending situations, circumstances often make the external enforcement of contracts either unavailable or too costly. Instead, in maintaining loan repayment incentives, lenders depend on reputation. With competition, maintaining this reputation-based incentive structure becomes increasingly difficult. As more lenders enter the market, the incentive to maintain a sound reputation with any single lender declines. Borrowers increasingly engage in strategic behavior and renege on loan contracts. The dissertation explores how the introduction of credit bureaus and similar information sharing mechanisms constrain opportunistic behavior.
Using experimental methods, two information regimes are compared: private reputation, as observed in relational lending, and public reputation, as exemplified by credit bureaus. Game theory is used to model lender behavior, given asymmetric information about borrower types (conditionally honest and strategic) and to derive predictions about market breakdown and the extent of credit rationing. The central determinants of willingness to lend are the beliefs about the expected proportion of honest borrowers in the pool and the variance of these expectations. Experiments are conducted to observe actual behavior.
Results show a connection between information regime, lending frequency, loan size, and repayment. Public reputation leads to less credit rationing (larger loans), lower frequency of (exploratory) lending, and a smaller lender share in surpluses generated. Stronger relationships, measured by multiple repeated loans with the same lender, also lead to a higher likelihood of repayment.
|Commitee:||Sam, Abdoul, Wu, Steven|
|School:||The Ohio State University|
|Department:||Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics|
|School Location:||United States -- Ohio|
|Source:||DAI-A 78/11(E), Dissertation Abstracts International|
|Keywords:||Asymmetric information, Credit bureaus, Experimental finance, Microfinance, Repayment incentives, Reputation|
Copyright in each Dissertation and Thesis is retained by the author. All Rights Reserved
The supplemental file or files you are about to download were provided to ProQuest by the author as part of a
dissertation or thesis. The supplemental files are provided "AS IS" without warranty. ProQuest is not responsible for the
content, format or impact on the supplemental file(s) on our system. in some cases, the file type may be unknown or
may be a .exe file. We recommend caution as you open such files.
Copyright of the original materials contained in the supplemental file is retained by the author and your access to the
supplemental files is subject to the ProQuest Terms and Conditions of use.
Depending on the size of the file(s) you are downloading, the system may take some time to download them. Please be