The thesis that perceptual experience is transparent has received considerable air-time in contemporary philosophy of mind and perception. Debate over its truth-value has reached an impasse. I diagnose this mired debate, and pursue a reformulation of the “transparency thesis” such that it can be more readily evaluated form the perspective of perceptual psychology and related subdisciplines. I argue that the empirical methods characteristic of these disciplines are important for evaluating the transparency thesis. Both historical and contemporary empirical results but substantial pressure on the transparency thesis.
|Commitee:||Wright, Cory, Wright, Wayne|
|School:||California State University, Long Beach|
|School Location:||United States -- California|
|Source:||MAI 56/01M(E), Masters Abstracts International|
|Subjects:||Philosophy, Psychology, Cognitive psychology|
|Keywords:||Perceptual experience, Transparency|
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