In cyber security systems, various security protocols have been developed to provide trustworthy communications. However, designing security protocol is challenging and errorprone, which is well illustrated by many security protocols attacks. Hence, it is necessary to provide a verification framework where the security protocols can be formally checked. In this thesis, we first analyze a vehicle charging protocol to show the strengths and weaknesses of existing methods. Then, we propose a verification framework, where the security protocols can be intuitively specified and efficiently verified. Comparing with the existing methods, our verification method requires no abstraction during the verification and works for an unbounded number of protocol sessions. Security protocols in real-world use not only cryptography but also physical properties. Hence, we develop a generic analysis method to the protocols that consider physical properties. We analyze a family of softwarebased attestation protocols using this method and find several security weaknesses.
|School:||National University of Singapore (Singapore)|
|School Location:||Republic of Singapore|
|Source:||DAI-A 77/06(E), Dissertation Abstracts International|
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