Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Investigation of CEO incentive compensation homogenization in US chemical and food manufacturers
by Breslauer, David, D.B.A., University of Phoenix, 2015, 230; 3714875
Abstract (Summary)

Executive compensation has become a focus of growing social inequity since the 2007- 2008 financial crisis. The ratio of CEO to average worker compensation in 2012 was over 270-to-1 and more than nine times its 1978 level. Ineffective regulations and excessive risk-taking motivated by misaligned incentives have been blamed for the financial crisis. The public scrutiny of executive compensation has organizations attempting to legitimize executive compensation contracts. The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal, correlational study was to examine the extent of CEO incentive compensation homogenization between and within large US food and chemical manufacturers over a five-year period (2008-2012). The results of this study indicate a correlation between research intensity level and the percent of total compensation paid as equity-based incentive only at the highest research intensity level. No significant correlations were found between the lowest and middle research intensity levels for equity-based incentives, and no significant correlations were found between research intensity and cash incentives. The findings of this study indicated significantly homogenized compensation structures across industries that could reflect isomorphism. Examination of more industries would expand the understanding of the level of homogenized compensation structures. Ex post facto examination of tax law changes and compensation allocations will help government officials devise regulations regarding compensation and incentives that maximize profits, limit risk seeking, and are socially equitable.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Pardo, David
School: University of Phoenix
School Location: United States -- Arizona
Source: DAI-A 76/12(E), Dissertation Abstracts International
Subjects: Business administration, Management, Finance
Keywords: Agency theory, CEO compensation, Compensation, Corporate governance, Incentive alignment, Incentives
Publication Number: 3714875
ISBN: 978-1-321-92674-3
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