Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Overcoming the present
by Weede, Christian C., M.A., California State University, Long Beach, 2015, 61; 1586526
Abstract (Summary)

We should reject presentism as the most intuitive theory of time. Prima facie, presentism might seem intuitive due to our perception of time. However, if presentism accurately represents the metaphysics of time, then presentism entails some counter-intuitive results regarding events, truths about the past, and temporary intrinsics. I argue that presentists can only allow for the present to be instantaneous, and then only at the cost of losing events as ontological entities. I argue that an ersatz B-series of times is viable only at the cost of losing the special metaphysical status of the present. Finally, I argue that the claim that propositions are true simpliciter is inconsistent with the claim that propositions are not eternally true. Given these problems, we can see that presentism has some strongly counter-intuitive entailments.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Wright, Cory
Commitee: Davidson, Matthew, Lascano, Marcy
School: California State University, Long Beach
Department: Philosophy
School Location: United States -- California
Source: MAI 54/04M(E), Masters Abstracts International
Subjects: Philosophy
Publication Number: 1586526
ISBN: 9781321682748
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