Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

A Lightweight Authenticated Symmetric Encryption Cipher for RFID Systems
by Jeddi, Zahra, Ph.D., University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 2014, 178; 3687692
Abstract (Summary)

Radio Frequency Identification, RFID, is a type of automatic identification system which has gained popularity in recent years for being fast and reliable in keeping track of individual objects. Due to limited available resources in RFID tags, providing privacy and security for RFID systems is one of the important challenges nowadays. In this dissertation, a lightweight symmetric encryption algorithm called RBS, Redundant Bit Security, is presented which is suitable for resource constrained applications like RFID systems. Confidentiality of the plaintext in this algorithm is achieved through inserting some redundant bits inside the plaintext bits where the location of redundant bits inside the ciphertext is the secret key shared between sender and receiver. Besides confidentiality, these redundant bits are calculated in such a way that they provide authentication and integrity as well. The security of the algorithm is analyzed against some well-known attacks such as known plaintext, known ciphertext, chosen plaintext, and differential attacks. Experimental and simulation results confirm that RBS implementation requires less power and area overhead compared to other known symmetric algorithms proposed for RFID systems, especially when the authentication is essential like in harsh environments.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Bayoumi, Magdy
Commitee: Kumar, Ashok, Madani, Mohammad, Wu, Hong-yi
School: University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Department: Computer Engineering
School Location: United States -- Louisiana
Source: DAI-B 76/08(E), Dissertation Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Computer Engineering, Information science
Keywords: Authentication, Cryptography, Lightweight cipher, Private key, RFID, Security
Publication Number: 3687692
ISBN: 9781321655698
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