There are many theories linking natural resource rents to violent conflict; few theories link rents to domestic political instability. Extending these theories to assess rents' relationship to political stability or instability yields thirty-three mechanisms by which rents affect political stability. I conduct case studies of the oil industries and political, economic, and societal factors present in Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa and examine how the production and export of oil affects the political stability of these countries. I find that although these countries are not dependent on rents for their defense and welfare spending, rents contribute to both stability and instability in both countries.
|School Location:||United States -- Missouri|
|Source:||MAI 54/03M(E), Masters Abstracts International|
|Keywords:||Cote d'Ivoire, Political instability, Resource curse, South Africa|
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