Clinically, delusions are considered beliefs, but some philosophers argue that delusions do not satisfy necessary conditions on belief. In this thesis, I defend the doxastic conception, the view that delusions are beliefs against an alternative account from G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2004). According to Stephens & Graham, some delusions are belief-like, but others are not; so not all delusions can be described as beliefs. Their alternative description is called the delusional stance. I argue that the delusional stance mischaracterizes conditions on belief, and mistakenly assumes that delusion is a unified phenomenon. I then reformulate the delusional stance as a set of belief dispositions, which I call a delusional belief stereotype. This reformulation demonstrates that the delusional stance is not a true alternative, but instead one version of the doxastic conception. In addition, I claim that a dispositionalist view promotes diagnosis and treatment of delusions with respect to delusion ascription.