Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Defending the doxastic conception of delusions
by Barrett, Emily H., M.A., California State University, Long Beach, 2014, 58; 1526892
Abstract (Summary)

Clinically, delusions are considered beliefs, but some philosophers argue that delusions do not satisfy necessary conditions on belief. In this thesis, I defend the doxastic conception, the view that delusions are beliefs against an alternative account from G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2004). According to Stephens & Graham, some delusions are belief-like, but others are not; so not all delusions can be described as beliefs. Their alternative description is called the delusional stance. I argue that the delusional stance mischaracterizes conditions on belief, and mistakenly assumes that delusion is a unified phenomenon. I then reformulate the delusional stance as a set of belief dispositions, which I call a delusional belief stereotype. This reformulation demonstrates that the delusional stance is not a true alternative, but instead one version of the doxastic conception. In addition, I claim that a dispositionalist view promotes diagnosis and treatment of delusions with respect to delusion ascription.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Wright, Cory
Commitee: Rosenkrantz, Max, Wieland, Nellie
School: California State University, Long Beach
Department: Philosophy
School Location: United States -- California
Source: MAI 53/06M(E), Masters Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Belief, Delusion, Philosophy of psychiatry
Publication Number: 1526892
ISBN: 9781321276923
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