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Clinically, delusions are considered beliefs, but some philosophers argue that delusions do not satisfy necessary conditions on belief. In this thesis, I defend the doxastic conception, the view that delusions are beliefs against an alternative account from G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2004). According to Stephens & Graham, some delusions are belief-like, but others are not; so not all delusions can be described as beliefs. Their alternative description is called the delusional stance. I argue that the delusional stance mischaracterizes conditions on belief, and mistakenly assumes that delusion is a unified phenomenon. I then reformulate the delusional stance as a set of belief dispositions, which I call a delusional belief stereotype. This reformulation demonstrates that the delusional stance is not a true alternative, but instead one version of the doxastic conception. In addition, I claim that a dispositionalist view promotes diagnosis and treatment of delusions with respect to delusion ascription.
Advisor: | Wright, Cory |
Commitee: | Rosenkrantz, Max, Wieland, Nellie |
School: | California State University, Long Beach |
Department: | Philosophy |
School Location: | United States -- California |
Source: | MAI 53/06M(E), Masters Abstracts International |
Source Type: | DISSERTATION |
Subjects: | Philosophy |
Keywords: | Belief, Delusion, Philosophy of psychiatry |
Publication Number: | 1526892 |
ISBN: | 978-1-321-27692-3 |