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Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

An argument against the person-affecting view of wrongness
by Bailey, Jeannine Marie, M.A., University of Colorado at Boulder, 2014, 42; 1565266
Abstract (Summary)

An act is usually thought of as wrong only if it harms someone and to harm someone is, roughly speaking, to make her worse off. However, the view that an act is wrong only if it harms some particular individual restricts us to a person-affecting view about wrongness. If an act is wrong that does not make any individual worse off, this wrongness cannot be explained in terms of person-affecting consequences. I want to propose that an action can be wrong even if no particular individual is harmed by that act. It is the goal of this paper to show that not only is this a plausible view about wrongness, but it is the correct view. On this view, there can be wrongness in the harm caused by diminishing the overall value in the world or by making the world a worse place than it otherwise would have been.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Norcross, Alastair
Commitee: Boonin, David, Hale, Benjamin
School: University of Colorado at Boulder
Department: Philosophy
School Location: United States -- Colorado
Source: MAI 53/06M(E), Masters Abstracts International
Subjects: Ethics, Philosophy
Keywords: Harm, Non-identity problem, Person-affecting, Procreative beneficence, Repugnant conclusion, Risky policy
Publication Number: 1565266
ISBN: 978-1-321-19744-0
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