In this dissertation I examine whether and how knowledge or cognitive achievements like it have final value. I first give an account of epistemic value according to which it is not a unique kind of value, but rather value simpliciter which attaches to epistemic objects. I then critically evaluate recent prominent accounts of the value of knowledge and find them lacking. I argue that both virtue- and curiosity-based accounts of the value of knowledge fail to ground universal final value for it. I conclude that knowledge does not in fact have universal final value, and propose my own view that not it, but understanding has what I call universal preconditional value: it is a precondition for the formation of values at all.
|Commitee:||Greenberg, Sean, Schwab, Martin|
|School:||University of California, Irvine|
|School Location:||United States -- California|
|Source:||DAI-A 75/11(E), Dissertation Abstracts International|
|Keywords:||Epistemology, Philosophy, Value theory|
Copyright in each Dissertation and Thesis is retained by the author. All Rights Reserved
The supplemental file or files you are about to download were provided to ProQuest by the author as part of a
dissertation or thesis. The supplemental files are provided "AS IS" without warranty. ProQuest is not responsible for the
content, format or impact on the supplemental file(s) on our system. in some cases, the file type may be unknown or
may be a .exe file. We recommend caution as you open such files.
Copyright of the original materials contained in the supplemental file is retained by the author and your access to the
supplemental files is subject to the ProQuest Terms and Conditions of use.
Depending on the size of the file(s) you are downloading, the system may take some time to download them. Please be