My dissertation consists of two essays regarding bank regulation and intervention. The first essay of my dissertation, "U.S. Bank Structure, Fragility, Bailout, and Failure During the U.S. Financial Crisis" examines the impact of bank structure, in terms of holding company structure, charter type, and publicly traded vs. private status, and measures of bank fragility on the likelihood a bank bailout or failure. The motivation for this study is to investigate whether empirical evidence associated with the causes of failures before the financial crisis differ from those associated with bank failures at the same time many banks were receiving bailout funds during the crisis. Since regulatory authorities decide which banks to bailout and which banks are allowed to fail, this essay provides information as to whether a bank's structure matters for the decisions made by the regulatory authorities, especially whether a particular structure is favored by the government through the provision of financial support when a financial crisis occurs.

My second essay, "Do Bank Regulation and Supervision Improve Bank Performance and Reduce The Likelihood of Banking Crises?" focuses on the impact of bank regulation and supervision on various banking outcomes. The emphasis is on whether specific bank regulations and supervisory practices changed over time and whether they reduced the likelihood of a country experiencing a banking crisis. Given the role that banks have played in crises over time and in countries worldwide, this cross country analysis is important to determine whether specific regulatory and supervisory practices have helped reduce the likelihood f crises in countries, and thereby enhanced bank stability, performance and development.