Kant and Fichte's respective accounts of evil share many similarities. This paper seeks to determine if and identify where the two accounts diverge. Due to the systematic nature of German Idealist writing, it is impossible to compare the relevant doctrines of Kant and Fichte and passages in a vacuum. Each explanation belongs to a broader account of evil which itself fits into an even more expansive moral philosophy. Thus, the paper has two goals, one belonging to history of philosophy, the other to moral philosophy. The former involves analyzing the differences that exist between the accounts of evil provided by Kant in Part One of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Fichte in section 16 of his System of Ethics. The latter furthers our understanding of self-conceit by comparing Kant and Fichte's explanations of this evil disposition. Ultimately, Fichte's account helps to explain the Kantian doctrine taken from Rousseau of 'unsociable sociability.'