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Behavioral economists have attempted to show that human iterated reasoning faculties discourage non-equilibrium, non-convergent game dynamics. But what if individuals iterating through each other's strategic intentions are instead driving complex collective dynamics? The results in this manuscript demonstrate that bounded "what you think I think you think" reasoning can cause sustained deviations from Nash equilibrium and other fixed-point solution concepts. Supporting my thesis are a series of six experiments, a revisitation of a classic game theory experiment, a variety of computational models, and an analysis of a real-world dataset with highly motivated agents. I also introduce two new games, the Mod Game and the Runway Game. By bridging human higher-level reasoning and animal collective behavior, this work challenges attitudes in economics that complex social dynamics can--or even should--be designed away.
Advisor: | Goldstone, Robert L., Todd, Peter M. |
Commitee: | Beer, Randall D., Busemeyer, Jerome R. |
School: | Indiana University |
Department: | Cognitive Science |
School Location: | United States -- Indiana |
Source: | DAI-B 75/02(E), Dissertation Abstracts International |
Source Type: | DISSERTATION |
Subjects: | Social psychology, Economics, Cognitive psychology |
Keywords: | Behavioral game theory, Collective behavior, Iterated reasoning, Multiple methods, Non-convergent dynamics, Non-equilibrium dynamics |
Publication Number: | 3599175 |
ISBN: | 978-1-303-48331-8 |