Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Complex collective dynamics in human higher-level reasoning; A study over multiple methods
by Frey, Seth, Ph.D., Indiana University, 2013, 324; 3599175
Abstract (Summary)

Behavioral economists have attempted to show that human iterated reasoning faculties discourage non-equilibrium, non-convergent game dynamics. But what if individuals iterating through each other's strategic intentions are instead driving complex collective dynamics? The results in this manuscript demonstrate that bounded "what you think I think you think" reasoning can cause sustained deviations from Nash equilibrium and other fixed-point solution concepts. Supporting my thesis are a series of six experiments, a revisitation of a classic game theory experiment, a variety of computational models, and an analysis of a real-world dataset with highly motivated agents. I also introduce two new games, the Mod Game and the Runway Game. By bridging human higher-level reasoning and animal collective behavior, this work challenges attitudes in economics that complex social dynamics can--or even should--be designed away.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Goldstone, Robert L., Todd, Peter M.
Commitee: Beer, Randall D., Busemeyer, Jerome R.
School: Indiana University
Department: Cognitive Science
School Location: United States -- Indiana
Source: DAI-B 75/02(E), Dissertation Abstracts International
Subjects: Social psychology, Economics, Cognitive psychology
Keywords: Behavioral game theory, Collective behavior, Iterated reasoning, Multiple methods, Non-convergent dynamics, Non-equilibrium dynamics
Publication Number: 3599175
ISBN: 978-1-303-48331-8
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