In recent years, both compatibilists and incompatibilists about moral responsibility and causal determinism have appealed to cases of manipulation in order to establish various theses about the conditions on moral responsibility and whether those conditions can be satisfied at a causally deterministic world. I will argue that (i) manipulation cases do not show that the conditions on moral responsibility for actions are inconsistent with the truth of causal determinism and that (ii) manipulation cases do not show that the conditions on moral responsibility for actions include any historical or subjective conditions.
|Commitee:||Lascano, Marcy, Nolan, Lawrence|
|School:||California State University, Long Beach|
|School Location:||United States -- California|
|Source:||MAI 51/05M(E), Masters Abstracts International|
|Subjects:||Ethics, Metaphysics, Philosophy|
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