Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Self-Cleaning Dilemma; Reconciling Competing Objectives of Procurement Processes
by Majtan, Roman, LL.M., The George Washington University, 2012, 83; 1515799
Abstract (Summary)

The U.S. and the World Bank's sanctions systems seek to ensure that firms and individuals conduct their work with integrity and that they comply with rules and regulations governing public procurement. The sanctions systems rely on the use of deterrence, which is most often achieved through debarment or exclusion of non-compliant contractors. However, in recent years, scholars introduced a self-cleaning theory, which proposes that firms and individuals should be allowed to regain the possibility of participation in public contracts if they have taken effective measures to ensure that wrongful acts will not recur in the future.

The proponents of the self-cleaning theory argue that this will improve integrity, that contractors have a fundamental right to public contracts, and that it will increase competition. The application of the self-cleaning theory to the U.S. and the World Bank sanctions systems illustrates that self-cleaning itself may not improve integrity due to lack of deterrence, that there is no fundamental right to public contracts, but that using self-cleaning instead of debarment increases competition. Since both integrity and competition are important objectives, there is a need to reconcile the existing tension.

The application of the self-cleaning theory to the U.S. and the World Bank sanctions systems demonstrates that it is possible to improve integrity and, at the same time, increase competition. These competing objectives may be achieved through designing a sensible sanctions framework, which takes into account a more flexible approach towards debarment and maintains deterrence, through restitution and other means.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Yukins, Christopher R.
Commitee:
School: The George Washington University
Department: Law
School Location: United States -- District of Columbia
Source: MAI 51/02M(E), Masters Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Law, International law
Keywords: Procurement, Sanctions process, Self-cleaning, World Bank
Publication Number: 1515799
ISBN: 978-1-267-52309-9
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