This Article examines the treatment of conflicts of interest in various public procurement regimes by examining the United States, the European Union and other international bodies. It suggests that a principal-agent model can be a useful tool for thinking about conflicts of interest and formulating policies capable of mitigating the risks posed by them to the integrity and legitimacy of public procurement. Recognizing that all regulatory frameworks impose transactional costs, this Article suggests that those costs are outweighed by the costs to the integrity of public procurement.
|Advisor:||Yukins, Christopher R.|
|School:||The George Washington University|
|School Location:||United States -- District of Columbia|
|Source:||MAI 51/01M(E), Masters Abstracts International|
|Subjects:||Law, Public administration|
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