Dissertation/Thesis Abstract

Advisor-induced demand and moral hazard in the third-party payer system
by Thomas, David Chandler, M.A., San Jose State University, 2012, 50; 1513680
Abstract (Summary)

Health-care consumption in the United States has risen from 5.2% in 1960 to 17.8% of 2009 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) creating a burden that will soon be too heavy for the economy to bear. This paper proposes that the primary accelerants of health-care expenditures result from the third-party payer system that emerged in the 1950s. These corporate benefits and government subsidies, when overlaid on the traditional health-care model, have led to sustained increases in the production, recommendation, and consumption of health care while magnifying the moral hazard problem inherent in health insurance.

Indexing (document details)
Advisor: Hummel, Jeffrey R.
Commitee: Henderson, David R., Hummel, Jeffrey R., Ortega, Lydia D.
School: San Jose State University
Department: Economics
School Location: United States -- California
Source: MAI 51/01M(E), Masters Abstracts International
Source Type: DISSERTATION
Subjects: Medical Ethics, Economics, Health care management
Keywords: Health care, Induced demand, Life expectancy, Medical insurance, Moral hazard, Subsidies
Publication Number: 1513680
ISBN: 9781267436931
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