On the Internet, link-resistant communication is only possible through the use of anonymous communication systems. Since the late 1990's many anonymous communication systems have been designed and deployed for use on the Internet. However, the performance of these systems is very low. In particular for the Tor network, the current state of the art anonymity system, latency of communications is not only high but also highly variable.
In this thesis we argue that current anonymity systems, as implemented, unnecessarily sacrifice performance for anonymity. By implementing subtle changes to the system architecture, it is possible to achieve anonymous communication in addition to good performance. We demonstrate, via implementation and measurements, that by using end-to-end design principles in anonymity systems it is possible to implement many desired anonymity properties while significantly increasing network performance.
|Advisor:||Camp, Linda J.|
|Commitee:||Fox, Geoofrey, Syverson, Paul, Wallace, Steve|
|School Location:||United States -- Indiana|
|Source:||DAI-B 73/10(E), Dissertation Abstracts International|
|Keywords:||Anonymity, Anonymity networks, End-to-end design, Onion routing, Performance|
Copyright in each Dissertation and Thesis is retained by the author. All Rights Reserved
The supplemental file or files you are about to download were provided to ProQuest by the author as part of a
dissertation or thesis. The supplemental files are provided "AS IS" without warranty. ProQuest is not responsible for the
content, format or impact on the supplemental file(s) on our system. in some cases, the file type may be unknown or
may be a .exe file. We recommend caution as you open such files.
Copyright of the original materials contained in the supplemental file is retained by the author and your access to the
supplemental files is subject to the ProQuest Terms and Conditions of use.
Depending on the size of the file(s) you are downloading, the system may take some time to download them. Please be